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ABSTRACT
In the not-too-distant future, your car could drive itself; technology
companies and automobile manufacturers alike are currently develop-
ing driverless vehicle technology. While there are many touted benefits
to driverless vehicles, perhaps the most important societal benefit is a
reduction in automobile accidents. Currently, car crashes are one of
the leading causes of death in the United States, and the majority of
accidents are caused by human error. Unlike humans, driverless vehi-
cles will not get distracted, significantly decreasing the number of car
crash fatalities that happen each year.
In order for driverless vehicles to save lives, driverless vehicles must be
on the roads. This means people must be willing and able to buy them.
Millennials have demonstrated interest in the technology, keeping in
line with their reputation for being early technology adopters, but un-
fortunately this demographic has limited buying power - a problem
when early driverless vehicles could command a premium of up to
$10,000.
To bridge the gap between desire and accessibility, the government
should enact a driverless vehicle subsidy program. The United States
government has, in recent years, implemented two different programs
to subsidy individuals’ vehicle purchases - The Energy Improvement
and Extension Act and the CARS program. Both programs successfully
influenced buyer behavior for vehicle purchases, but the CARS pro-
gram, which offered consumers a rebate at the time they bought their
car, was particularly well-received.
This note proposes a government subsidy for driverless vehicles closely
mirrored after the Cash for Clunkers program. By offering a rebate to
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the consumer at the time of sale, individuals will be better able to af-
ford driverless vehicles, thereby accelerating the overall adoption of
this potentially life-saving technology.
INTRODUCTION
The potential benefits of driverless vehicles, the “next profound trans-
portation technology,”1 are vast. Researchers suggest that driverless vehicles
will increase mobility for those currently unable to drive, decrease energy
use and pollution, and allow commuters to create value in their travel time
by engaging in work or leisure activities instead of operating their vehicles.2
The most touted benefit of driverless vehicles is that they will be safer than
their human-operated counterparts.3 But while the safety benefits of driver-
less vehicles could be vast, driverless vehicles will be expensive, with some
reports speculating that they will be $7,000-$10,000 more expensive than
human-operated vehicles.4 This premium price could make driverless vehi-
cles inaccessible to interested buyers, thereby slowing the critical early
adoption of the technology.
This note proposes a new federal incentive program to overcome the
cost barrier. Part I discusses the potential safety benefits of driverless vehi-
cles. Part II introduces the technology adoption lifecycle and proposes mil-
lennials, a tech-savvy and price-sensitive demographic, as the likely adopters
of driverless technology. Part III examines two previously enacted federal
incentive programs – the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008
and the Car Allowance Rebate System (“CARS”) – that offered car buyers
tax credits or rebates when they purchased particular vehicle models. Part IV
recommends a federal incentive program to encourage and foster early
purchases of driverless vehicles.
PART I. SAFETY AND DRIVERLESS VEHICLES
Motor vehicle crashes are one of the leading causes of death in the
United States.5 The National Safety Council estimated that, in 2015, “38,300
people were killed on U.S. roads, and 4.4 million were seriously injured,”
1. David Levinson, Climbing Mount Next: The Effects of Autonomous Vehicles on So-
ciety, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 787, 794 (2015).
2. See generally JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, AUTONOMOUS VE-
HICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RR443-2.html.
3. See id.
4. See J.C. SULLIVAN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WHAT WILL DRIVE THE FU-
TURE OF SELF-DRIVING CARS?, at 9 (2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
Future-of-driverless-cars.pdf.
5. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, INJURY PREVENTION & CON-
TROL: DATA & STATISTICS (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/leadingcauses.html.
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making it the deadliest driving year since 2008.6 The majority of these car
crashes – a number as high as 94% according to the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration – were likely caused by human error.7 But unlike
humans who get distracted, disobey traffic laws, and sometimes fail to see
what is happening around them on the road, driverless cars “do not get dis-
tracted or tired, have almost instantaneous perception-reaction times, and
know exactly how hard to brake or when to swerve.”8 Indeed, Google’s driv-
erless cars have traversed more than 1.3 million miles since 2009, and of the
fleet’s 17 minor accidents, all but one were caused by human error.9
With up to 94% of current car accidents being caused by human error,10
it is natural to assume that having more driverless vehicles on the road
would result in fewer auto accidents. Researchers at the University of Utah
and the University of Texas have predicted the safety impact that driverless
vehicles could have at 10%, 50%, and 90% market penetration rates.11 At
10% market penetration, researchers estimate that there would be 211,000
fewer car crashes and 1,100 fewer car crash fatalities each year.12 At 90%
market penetration these numbers jump to 4,220,000 and 21,700, respec-
tively,13 an approximately 57% decrease in crash fatalities when compared
to 2015.14
6. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, MOTOR VEHICLE DEATHS INCREASE BY LARGEST PERCENT
IN 50 YEARS (2016), http://www.nsc.org/Connect/NSCNewsReleases/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID
=104.e4535-5dc3-45d6-b190-9b49c7229931&ID=103&var=hppress&Web=36d1832e-7bc3-
4029-98a1-317c5cd5c625.
7. See SANTOKH SINGH, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS: CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE
CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublica-
tion/812115; see also Laiza King, Top 15 Causes of Car Accidents and How You Can Prevent
Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laiza-king-/top-15-
causes-of-car-accidents_b_11722196.html.
8. Levinson, supra note 1, at 795.
9. See Eric Tegler, Why It’s Impossible to Tell How Safe Self-Driving Cars Really Are,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a20367/rand-
self-driving-study/ (noting Google’s accident statistics but also warning that the overall safety
of driverless vehicles shouldn’t be extrapolated from Google’s data – “autonomous cars would
have to be driven hundreds of millions of miles, and under some scenarios, hundreds of bil-
lions of miles to create enough data to clearly demonstrate their safety.”). But see Alison
Griswold, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are Already Getting Into Scrapes on the Streets of Pitts-
burgh, QUARTZ (Oct. 4, 2016), http://qz.com/798092/a-self-driving-uber-car-went-the-wrong-
way-on-a-one-way-street-in-pittsburgh/ (revealing that other driverless vehicles haven’t had a
track record as impressive as Google’s. Residents in Pittsburgh have observed several acci-
dents and driving errors committed by Uber’s driverless cars).
10. See SINGH supra note 7.
11. Daniel J. Flagnant & Kara Kockelman, Preparing a Nation for Autonomous Vehi-
cles: Opportunities, Barriers and Policy Recommendations, 77 TRANSP. RES. PART A 167
(July 2015).
12. Id. at 175.
13. Id. at 175.
14. See supra note 6.
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Recognizing the prevalence of car crash fatalities caused by human er-
ror, the United States federal government is committed to automated solu-
tions. One of the Department of Transportation’s primary goals is to
“improve public health and safety by reducing transportation-related fatali-
ties, injuries and crashes.”15 A recent strategic report reveals that the Depart-
ment of Transportation is encouraging “the deployment of effective
advanced vehicle automation technologies to enhance safety.”16 The Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration agrees that automated vehicle
technologies could be the key to safety improvements; in its 2017 budget
plan, NHTSA allocated $200 million, nearly 17% of its $1.181 billion
budget, for “Autonomous Vehicle Deployment,” funds to “help ensure rapid
adoption by the public” given the technology’s “potential to reduce
crashes.”17
While driverless vehicles currently exist and, in limited circumstances,
are driven on public roads,18 no one knows when driverless cars will make
their commercial debut.19 Even if automakers can overcome all engineering
roadblocks, existing legal and regulatory obstacles may slow the commercial
availability of driverless vehicles.20 For example, although Google has been
testing its driverless vehicles on public roads since 2009,21 the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration - the agency that issues mandatory
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards - just released its first set of guide-
lines for self-driving cars in September of 2016.22 And, as of December
2016, Florida and Michigan are the only states that allow completely driver-
15. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FY-2015 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT/FY-2017 AN-
NUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, at 11 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/
docs/FY15-PerformanceReport-FY17-PerformancePlan-508.pdf.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION FOR A NEW GENERATION: STRATEGIC
PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-18, at 24 (2013), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/
docs/2014-2018-strategic-plan_0.pdf.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2017: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 26-27, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fy2017-
nhtsa_cbj_final_02_2016.pdf.
18. Beginning in August 2016, Uber allowed customers to summon its self-driving cars
in downtown Pittsburgh. See Max Chafkin, Uber’s First Self-Driving Fleet Arrives in Pitts-
burgh this Month, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2016-08-18/uber-s-first-self-driving-fleet-arrives-in-pittsburgh-this-month-is06r7on.
19. Some automakers have revealed aspirational dates for the rollout of driverless vehi-
cles. For instance, Ford announced that it would have fleets of driverless vehicles on the road
in a ride-hailing service by 2021. Neal E. Boudette, Ford Promises Fleets of Driverless Cars
Within Five Years, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/busi-
ness/ford-promises-fleets-of-driverless-cars-within-five-years.html.
20. See generally, ANDERSON, supra note 2.
21. See Tegler, supra note 9.
22. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VE-
HICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY (2016).
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less vehicles to operate on public roads.23 But even in a world with no red
tape, in order for driverless vehicles to achieve significant market penetra-
tion consumers must be willing, and able, to buy them.
PART II. PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Studies indicate that millennials are poised to be early adopters of driv-
erless vehicles. Millennials are the generation most interested in the technol-
ogy,24 but they are also the most price-sensitive purchasers of vehicles – a
recent Kelly Blue Book study reported that the primary reason 57 percent of
millennials are not buying cars is due to cost, especially as the average price
of a new car has climbed to nearly $35,000.25 This economic sensitivity
combined with driverless vehicles’ premium price supports the notion that
monetary incentives are necessary in order to achieve important early market
penetration.
A. Millennials and the Technology Adoption Lifecycle
The adoption of new technologies tends to play out along a bell curve.26
The technology adoption lifecycle, a theory popularized by Everett Rogers,
categorizes consumers into five groups – innovators, early adopters, early
majority, late majority, and laggards.27 Innovators, the first individuals to
adopt a new technology, represent 2.5% of an invention’s market share, and
tend to be young, connected, and willing to take risks.28 Early adopters,
13.5% of the market share, also tend to be young and have a high degree of
opinion leadership, which means they influence whether an innovation is
eventually adopted by the early majority, late majority, and laggards.29 Gen-
erally, manufacturers expect millennials (people aged 18-34) to be innova-
tors and early adopters, especially in the technology sphere;30 they were
23. While ten states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation concerning
autonomous vehicles, Florida and Michigan are the only two states whose legislation does not
preclude driverless vehicles. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, AUTONOMOUS SELF-
DRIVING VEHICLES LEGISLATION, Dec. 12, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/
autonomous-vehicles-legislation.aspx#Enacted Autonomous Vehicle Legislation.
24. See HILLARY ABRAHAM ET AL., MIT AGELAB, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, TRUST,
AND DRIVING ALTERNATIVES: A SURVEY OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES, at 9 (2016), http://age-
lab.mit.edu/files/publications/2016_6_Autonomous_Vehicles_Consumer_Preferences.pdf.
25. See Robert Duffer, Why Aren’t Millennials Buying Cars? They Are, Despite Record
Prices, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/sc-
millennials-autocover-1208-story.html.
26. See generally EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (Simon & Schuster
eds., 5th ed. 1962), at 281.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 281-83.
29. Id.
30. See Adrienne LaFrance, One Thing Baby Boomers and Millenials Agree On: Self-
Driving Cars, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/10/snake-people-cars/410923/.
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among the first to adopt MP3 players, social media networks, gaming plat-
forms, smartphones, and tablets.31
Consistent with the belief that millennials are innovators and early
adopters, research suggests that they are the population most interested in
driverless vehicles. According to a 2016 MIT AgeLab survey, 40% of par-
ticipants aged 25 to 34 were comfortable with the idea of driverless cars,
compared with only 18.9% of participants aged 55 to 64.32 Similarly, a 2014
survey conducted by Deloitte reported that 47% of surveyed millennials
were comfortable with driverless cars, an opinion shared by only 31% of
respondents from all other generations.33
B. Millennials and Car Buying
The United States’ auto market is currently booming. In 2015, 17.39
million cars were sold in the United States, an all-time record and a 5.8%
increase over 2014; there has been year-over-year sales growth for six con-
secutive years.34 While car sales have increased over this time period, car
manufacturers have struggled to reach millennials.35
Rather than buy their own vehicles, some millennials instead choose to
rely on rideshare services like Uber and Lyft.36 A wholesale shift to “access
over ownership”37 could slow down the adoption of driverless vehicle tech-
31. See MARKETING CHARTS, MILLENIALS CHALLENGE STEREOTYPES, BUT ARE RAPID
TECH ADOPTERS (Apr. 17), 2012, http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/millennials-chal-
lenge-stereotypes-but-are-rapid-tech-adopters-21814/.
32. ABRAHAM ET AL., supra note 24, at 9.
33. DELOITTE, 2014 GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE CONSUMER STUDY: EXPLORING CONSUMERS’
MOBILITY CHOICES AND TRANSPORTATION DECISIONS, at 17 (2014), https://www2.deloitte
.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-auto-global-automotive-con-
sumer-study-100914.pdf.
34. AUTO ALLIANCE, AUTO MARKETPLACE SALES DATA, http://www.autoalliance.org/
auto-marketplace/sales-data (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
35. See Nin-Hai Tseng, Why Car Companies Can’t Win Young Adults, FORTUNE (Aug.
16, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/16/why-car-companies-cant-win-young-adults/.
36. See J.C. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 6.
37. Id.
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nology, a fear that has caused some car manufacturers to explore the inter-
section of driverless vehicles and ridesharing.38 But the enthusiasm for and
prevalence of ridesharing may be overstated. Currently the services are only
available in metropolitan and suburban areas; 28% of urban residents aged
18 to 49 have used ridesharing services compared to only 4% of rural re-
sidents in the same age bracket.39 But even among those who have access to
and frequently use ridesharing, the majority of users – 63% – own and drive
a car on a daily or weekly basis.40 Additionally, a 2014 survey revealed that
80% of millennials intended to purchase or lease a car within five years,41
suggesting that traditional car ownership is still a priority for most
millennials.
C. Affordability as an Obstacle to Adopting Driverless Vehicles
Despite their interest in car ownership, millennials are delaying their
vehicle purchases.42 Research indicates that affordability is the top reason
why millennials don’t own cars;43 in an online survey conducted by the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute, 32% of adults under
the age of 40 said that owning and maintaining a vehicle is too expensive.44
Analysts have proposed that poor economic conditions – burdensome stu-
dent debt and entry-level salaries or unemployment – have caused millenni-
als to seek transportation alternatives until they’re better positioned to buy a
car.45
38. For example, Ford has announced its intent to have driverless vehicles in commer-
cial operation in a ridesharing service by 2021, and General Motors has pursued an alliance
with Lyft. FORD, FORD TARGETS FULLY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE FOR RIDE SHARING IN 2021;
INVESTS IN NEW TECH COMPANIES, DOUBLES SILICON VALLEY TEAM (Aug. 16, 2016), https://
media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2016/08/16/ford-targets-fully-autonomous-
vehicle-for-ride-sharing-in-2021.html; Michelle Krebs, Autonomous Cars with Ridesharing
Key to GM’s Vision for Future Mobility, AUTOTRADER (June 2016), http://www.auto trader
.com/car-shopping/autonomous-cars-with-ridesharing-key-to-gms-vision-for-future-mobility-
254768.
39. Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RES.
CENTER (2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/on-demand-ride-hailing-apps/#fn-158
14-2.
40. Id.
41. DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 5.
42. Ultimately, this delay could help the widespread adoption of driverless technology
since Americans tend to keep their cars for roughly 11 years. See Mike Spector & Mike Ram-
sey, U.S. Proposes Spending $4 Billion to Encourage Driverless Cars, WALL STREET J. (Jan.
14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-proposes-spending-4-billion-on-
driverless-car-guidelines-1452798787.
43. DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 6.
44. BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL SIVAK, U. MICH. TRANSP. RES. INST., THE REA-
SONS FOR THE RECENT DECLINE IN YOUNG DRIVER LICENSING IN THE U.S., at 11 (2013), https:/
/deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/99124/102951.pdf.
45. See Marc Fisher, Cruising Toward Oblivion: America’s Once Magical – Now Mun-
dane – Love Affair with Cars, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
sf/style/2015/09/ 02/americas-fading-car-culture/; Dee-Ann Durbin, 4 Reasons Millennials are
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But once millennials do visit dealerships to purchase cars, there is still a
limit on how much they are willing to spend for autonomous features. Sev-
enty-nine percent of millennials would be willing to pay extra for driverless
vehicle technology, but only 27% would be willing to pay a premium of
$2,500 or more.46 Unfortunately, the sensor technology needed for driverless
cars could initially inflate vehicle prices by $7,000 to $10,000.47 To en-
courage the widespread adoption of driverless vehicles and achieve the
safety benefits flowing from high market penetration, the gap between the
price of these vehicles and millennials’ willingness to pay for them must be
closed.
PART III. FEDERAL INCENTIVES TO SUBSIDIZE THE COST OF VEHICLES
Federal and state governments have previously encouraged the Ameri-
can public to purchase new vehicles by making the vehicles more affordable;
this has been achieved primarily through tax incentives and rebate programs.
In the past decade alone, Congress has enacted two such incentive programs
– the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 200848 and the Car Allow-
ance Rebate System, commonly referred to as “Cash for Clunkers,” in
2009.49
A. The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008
The goal of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (“the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act”) is to reduce the United States’
dependence on petroleum “by promoting expanded use of advanced, more
fuel-efficient vehicle technologies.”50 Recognizing that electric vehicles
often “cost thousands of dollars more to purchase than conventional vehicles
of comparable size and performance,” the Energy Improvement and Exten-
sion Act introduced a tax credit for consumer purchases of plug-in electric
vehicles.51
Under the Act, upon purchasing a plug-in electric vehicle, a taxpayer
may claim a $2,500 federal tax credit, plus an additional $417 credit for each
Buying Cars in Big Numbers, CHI. TRIB.(March 10, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
classified/automotive/sc-millennial-car-buyers-autos-0317-20160309-story.html.
46. DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 16.
47. See SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 9; see also Levi Tillemann & Colin McCormick,
This Could Be the Biggest Hurdle for Driverless Cars, FORTUNE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://fortune
.com/2016/02/15/driverless-cars-google-lyft/; but see Alex Davies, Turns Out the Hardware in
Self-Driving Cars is Pretty Cheap, WIRED (April 22, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/
cost-of-sensors-autonomous-cars/.
48. 26 U.S.C. § 30D (2008).
49. See infra Part III.
50. 154 Cong. Rec. S9,256-57 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Levin).
51. CONG. OF U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., EFFECTS OF FEDERAL TAX CREDITS FOR THE
PURCHASE OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES, at 6 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/09-20-12-ElectricVehicles_0.pdf.
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kilowatt-hour of battery capacity above five kilowatt-hours.52 The federal
credit is capped at $7,500,53 although some state governments passed legisla-
tion extending additional state tax credits.54 The federal tax credit includes a
“phaseout period” wherein the credit may only be claimed for the purchase
of the first 200,000 units of a particular model of plug-in electric vehicle.55
President Obama’s initial goal for the Energy Improvement and Exten-
sion Act was to get 1,000,000 electric plug-in vehicles on the road by
2015;56 but, as of August 2016, only 500,000 electric plug-in vehicles have
been sold in the United States.57 The slow adoption of electric plug-in vehi-
cles has been attributed to everything from “range anxiety” – the fear that an
electric car will not have enough stored power to complete one’s intended
route58 – to a general lack of familiarity with the technology,59 the perceived
inconvenience of installing a charging station at home,60 and falling gasoline
prices.61 Analysts have also pointed to various financial obstacles; electric
plug-in vehicles “often cost $8,000 to $10,000 more than equivalent sized
gasoline powered cars.”62 Making the problem worse, buyers may not be
aware of the available tax incentives designed to mitigate the higher price
tag of electric vehicles.63
Since its adoption, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act has
faced criticism and failed attempts at reform. In 2011, Senator Debbie Stabe-
now of Michigan reintroduced the Charging America Forward Act, a propo-
sal to convert the Energy Improvement and Extension Act’s maximum
52. 26 U.S.C. § 30D (2016).
53. See id.
54. Some states have offered additional tax credits, most of which range from $2,500 to
$6,000. In addition to tax credits for the purchase of plug-in electric vehicles, some states have
offered plug-in electric vehicle buyers credits for the installation of charging stations, access to
high-occupancy vehicle lanes, lower licensing fees, reduced toll fare, and free parking. See
Kristy Hartman, State Efforts Promote Hybrid and Electric Vehicles, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-electric-vehicle-in-
centives-state-chart.aspx.
55. See 26 U.S.C. § 30D (2016).
56. See David Shepardson, U.S. May Not Hit One Million Electric Vehicles Until 2020:
Official, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-electric-moniz-id
USKCN0UZ2MK.
57. See Jeff Cobb, Americans Buy Their Half-Millionth Plug-in Car, HYBRIDCARS
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.hybridcars.com/americans-buy-their-half-millionth-plug-in-car/.
58. See Joel Hruska, New MIT Study Claims ‘Range Anxiety’ Fears About Electric Ve-
hicles Are Overblown, EXTREME TECH (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.extremetech.com/
extreme/233832-new-mit-study-claims-range-anxiety-fears-about-electric-vehicles-are-over
blown.
59. See Yuliya Chernova, What’s Holding Back Electric-Car Sales?, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-s-holding-back-electric-car-sales-141193
7798.
60. See id.
61. See Cobb, supra note 54.
62. Shepardson, supra note 56.
63. See Chernova, supra note 59.
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$7,500 tax credit into a rebate.64 Unlike tax credits that may, due to the delay
between the purchase of the vehicle, the buyer’s tax filing, and the issuance
of a tax return, take more than a year to “affect a buyer’s cash position,” a
buyer would be able to receive the proposed rebate within weeks of purchas-
ing a qualifying plug-in electric vehicle.65 Additionally, the proposed rebate
would have equalized the monetary incentive for all buyers regardless of
federal income tax liability; under the tax credit system, those with low tax
liability may not always receive the full value of the credit because their
total tax liability may not match or exceed the amount of the credit
awarded.66 President Obama echoed the superiority of the rebate system,
proposing that the rebate could be claimed by car dealers and passed on to
the consumer.67 Other politicians took a different approach and advocated
for raising the cap on the number of plug-in vehicles eligible for the tax
credit; Carl Levin, also a Michigan senator, advocated to raise the cap from
200,000 vehicles to 500,000.68 Ultimately none of these reforms were
adopted and the tax credit persists in its original form.69
Despite criticisms of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act and
the fact that sales of plug-in electric vehicles in the United States are approx-
imately 500,000 vehicles shy of President Obama’s goal, the tax credit still
appeared to motivate consumers to buy plug-in electric vehicles. According
to a 2016 study conducted by researchers at the University of California,
Davis, 92% of plug-in electric vehicle buyers reported that the federal tax
credit was the most important monetary incentive for their purchase deci-
sion.70 Ultimately, the study found that “the federal incentive increased the
sales of [plug-in electric vehicles] by about 32.5% between 2010 and
2014”71 and has advanced the purchase timing of these vehicles by a year or
more.72
64. John Voelcker, Senator Stabenow: $7,500 Electric-Car Credit Should Be Rebate,
GREEN CAR REPORTS (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.greencarreports.com/news/1055032_senator-
stabenow-7500-electric-car-credit-should-be-rebate.
65. Id.
66. See CONG. OF THE U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 47, at 25.
67. Nick Chambers, White House Pushes for a $7,500 Instant Cash Rebate Towards
Electric Car Purchases, PLUG-IN CARS (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.plugincars.com/white-
house-pushes-instant-7500-cash-rebate-towards-electric-car-purchases-106794.html.
68. See Voelcker, supra note 64.
69. See id.; see also Chambers, supra note 67.
70. Gil Tal & Michael Nicholas, Exploring the Impact of the Federal Tax Credit on the
Plug-In Vehicle Market, 2572 TRANSP. RES. REC. 95, 97 (2016).
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id. at 95.
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B. The Car Allowance Rebate System
The Car Allowance Rebate System (“CARS”) was enacted in July
2009.73 The primary goal of the CARS program, commonly referred to as
“Cash for Clunkers,”74 was to stimulate the economy and aid a struggling
auto industry by accelerating households’ automobile purchases while put-
ting more fuel-efficient cars on the road.75  Under the CARS program, buy-
ers could receive a “bonus” for trading in their existing “clunker” and
purchasing a new vehicle with improved gas mileage.76 To be eligible for the
credit, the trade-in vehicle must have been manufactured in 1984 or later and
must have had a mileage rating of 18 miles per gallon or worse.77
The credit, distributed in the form of a voucher, was for either $3,500 or
$4,500 depending on the improvement in mileage between the trade-in vehi-
cle and the newly purchased vehicle – improvements of four to nine miles
per gallon allowed buyers to claim the $3,500 credit, while improvements of
ten miles per gallon or more earned buyers $4,500.78  When making a sale
under the CARS program, upon an eligible buyer trade-in, car dealers would
deduct the $3,500 or $4,500 credit from the price of the new vehicle; under
the CARS program, the dealers were the parties who sought repayment from
the government.79
Congress initially allocated $1 billion in federal funding to the CARS
program, but following widespread participation and demand in its first
month alone, Congress added $2 billion in additional funding.80 This addi-
tional funding was quickly exhausted; the popular “Cash for Clunkers” pro-
gram ended on August 24, 2009, approximately two months after the
program was first introduced.81 “According to the Department of Transporta-
tion, there were 690,114 applications for vouchers under the program.”82
Even though the program was a hit with consumers, critics attacked the
CARS program on a number of fronts. Many critics argued that the program
failed to create positive environmental effects; some focused on the high
levels of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere due to the production
73. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF THE CAR ALLOWANCE REBATE SYSTEM (“CASH FOR CLUNKERS”)(2009).
74. See generally id.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See generally id.
77. Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1302,
123 Stat. 1972.
78. Id. at 1909-10.
79. Matthew L. Wald, In Congress, a Jump-Start for Clunkers, N.Y. TIMES (July 31,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/business/01clunkers.html?pagewanted=all.
80. See id.
81. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Cash for Clunkers Ending, CNN MONEY (Aug. 21, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/20/autos/cash_for_clunkers_end/index.htm?postversion=2009
082016.
82. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, supra note
73, at 2.
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of new cars,83 while others complained that, due to fuel-efficient vehicles’
decreased cost-per-mile-driven, consumers would drive their new vehicles
more and completely mitigate the program’s intended reduction in fuel con-
sumption.84 Other studies suggested that the program did not significantly
impact vehicles’ average fuel economy.85 But data released by the Depart-
ment of Transportation revealed that the “clunkers” destroyed under the
CARS program “averaged 15.8 [miles per gallon], compared with 25.4
[miles per gallon] for the new vehicles purchased, for an average fuel-econ-
omy increase of 6.1%.”86
Other critics focused on the program’s economic effects, claiming that
the CARS program merely accelerated new vehicle purchases but did not
change the cumulative number of cars purchased over a one-year period.87
Stated another way, the only people who bought new cars under “Cash for
Clunkers” were people who planned on buying new cars anyway; various
studies have resounded this suspicion.88 But, given the dual purpose of the
CARS program—stimulating car sales and encouraging consumers to buy
fuel-efficient vehicles89—it is worth noting that during the duration of the
program, there was an increase in sales of vehicles that met the program’s
fuel efficiency requirements, and an accompanying decrease in sales of vehi-
cles that failed to meet the program’s fuel efficiency requirements, sug-
gesting that some consumers “switched” their purchases from gas guzzlers
to fuel-efficient cars.90 In short, the CARS program influenced consumers’
decisions about which vehicle to buy.
83. See Christopher Joyce, Critics Say ‘Clunkers’ Program Isn’t Very Green, NPR
(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111511131.
84. See Edward Glaeser, Program Has Clunky Reasoning, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 8,
2009), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/08/08/pro-
gram_has_clunky_reasoning/.
85. See generally MICHAEL SIVAK & BRANDON SCHOETTLE, U. MICH. TRANSP. RES.
INSTITUTE, The Effect of the “Cash for Clunkers” Program on the Overall Fuel Economy of
Purchased New Vehicles (Sept. 2009), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027
.42/64025/102323.pdf?sequence=1.
86. Bryan Walsh, Cash for Clunkers: How Big an Environmental Boost?, TIME (Aug. 5,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1914602,00.html.
87. See Brad Plumer, Almost Anything Would Have Been Better Stimulus Than ‘Cash
for Clunkers’, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2013/10/31/almost-anything-would-have-been-better-stimulus-than-cash-for-clunkers/?utm_
term=.5ffe612bcfa0.
88. Id.; see Stan Veuger, A Clunker of a Program, U.S. NEWS, Aug. 14, 2014, http://
www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/08/14/obamas-cash-for-clunkers-stim-
ulus-bailout-failed-car-companies; but see Shanjun Li et al., Resources for the Future, Evaluat-
ing “Cash-for-Clunkers”: Program Effects on Auto Sales and the Environment, 18 (2011),
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-10-39-REV.pdf.
89. See supra Part III.
90. Li, supra note 85, at 17.
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PART IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM
FOR DRIVERLESS VEHICLES
A driverless vehicle incentive program should strive to achieve the goals
of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act while being modeled after
the CARS program. The goal of a driverless vehicle incentive program
should parallel the goal of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act—
encouraging Americans to adopt a new automotive technology that has soci-
etal benefits. Despite this similarity, the federal government’s driverless ve-
hicle incentive program should emulate the CARS program because the
CARS program successfully served a dual purpose, was enthusiastically ac-
cepted by consumers, and spurred rapid behavior change. The federal gov-
ernment should allocate additional money to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration in order to create a rebate system, modeled closely
after CARS, for driverless vehicles.
As discussed in Part I, motor vehicle crashes are one of the leading
causes of death in the United States.91 Driverless vehicles are predicted to
decrease the number of annual automobile crashes and related fatalities be-
cause driverless vehicles, unlike humans, don’t get distracted or make other
driving errors.92 The more driverless vehicles are on the road, the more
safety benefits are expected. But even if only 10% of the cars on United
States roads are driverless, it is predicted that there will be 211,000 fewer car
crashes each year and 1,100 fewer car crash fatalities.93 If 90% market pene-
tration is reached, it is predicted that there will be 4,220,000 fewer crashes
each year and 21,700 fewer fatalities.94
Naturally, 90% penetration can only be achieved if consumers are able
to buy driverless vehicles, and early adopters play a critical role in the dis-
semination of new technologies. Early adopters stimulate behavior among
later adopters by spreading information about their own use of the product
—this sharing of information will be especially important for driverless ve-
hicles since giving up control over one’s own vehicle, a new notion in trans-
portation, could “pose considerable uncertainty for a potential adopter.”95
Additionally, early adopters accelerate the reduction of a product’s price
over time, further encouraging widespread adoption.96
Like CARS, the Driverless Vehicle Rebate program should be a direct
rebate applied at the time of purchase. The amount of the rebate should
equal the premium price of the driverless vehicle as compared to human-
91. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 5.
92. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 795.
93. See Flagnant, supra note 11.
94. Id.
95. Federico Frattini et al., The Role of Early Adopters in the Diffusion of New Prod-
ucts: Differences Between Platform and Nonplatform Innovations, 31 J. PROD. INNOVATION
MGMT. 466, 469 (2014).
96. See id.
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operated models, which is currently predicted to be $7,000 to $10,000.97
Assuming $2 billion in initial funding for the rebate program—the same
amount allocated to CARS—a rebate of $10,000 per driverless car, and neg-
ligible administrative costs, the initial rebate would apply to 200,000 vehi-
cles. These 200,000 vehicles would likely represent more than 10% of total
annual auto sales in the United States.98
The rebate program for driverless vehicles should be modeled after
CARS primarily because CARS was consumer-friendly. Rather than requir-
ing consumers to calculate the value of the credit that they would then de-
clare on their income taxes, the CARS program shifted the responsibility of
reimbursement to the car dealerships. Additionally, the rebate was applied at
the time of purchase and the effect of the rebate was not distorted by the
buyer’s declared income.99
Shifting the responsibility to dealerships also served an important mar-
keting function: “[T]he onus of promotion [was taken] off the government
because industries that stood to benefit had incentive to promote [the pro-
gram].”100 Car dealers’ interest in promoting the program paired with the
memorable moniker —Cash for Clunkers—solved the problem of low con-
sumer awareness that may have troubled the Energy Improvement and Ex-
tension Act.101 Additionally, the CARS program model has been applied to
other consumer goods including computers and home appliances;102 this im-
plies that the mechanism for reimbursement is easily developed and could be
implemented for a new class of automobiles.
Many of the criticisms of the CARS program wouldn’t apply to a simi-
lar program for driverless vehicles. Unlike the CARS program, which many
industry leaders hoped would stimulate the economy by boosting car
sales,103 the purpose of a driverless vehicle incentive program would be to
change the behavior of consumers who already plan on buying a car. The
incentive would focus on giving a sufficient discount on the price of the
vehicle so cash-constrained innovators can afford to buy a driverless car
instead of a less expensive human-operated model. The CARS program was
successful in influencing this kind of behavior change —consumers who
already planned on buying vehicles before the enactment of the CARS pro-
gram tended to switch their purchase decision from a program-ineligible to a
program-eligible car.104
97. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 9.
98. See Auto Alliance, supra note 34.
99. See discussion supra Part III.
100. Marianne Tyrrell & John C. Dernbach, The “Cash for Clunkers” Program: A Sus-
tainability Evaluation, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 467, 486 (2011).
101. See supra Part III.
102. See Tyrell & Dernbach, supra note 100, at 486.
103. See supra Part III.
104. See Li, supra note 88.
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Another potential obstacle is political. Because Congress approves the
federal budget, proposed spending programs like the Driverless Vehicle Re-
bate program require bipartisan support, or nearly unanimous support by the
controlling party. Given the profound impact driverless vehicles could have
on the number of car crashes and related fatalities that occur each year,105
and the Department of Transportation’s interest in autonomous vehicle tech-
nology as a solution, one might think that Congress could easily agree on a
federal program that incentivizes people to buy driverless vehicles. But, his-
tory has shown that fights along political party lines have frequently slowed
or halted legislation related to automotive safety.106 And opinions about gov-
ernment spending are even more contentious.107 While the CARS program
was adopted with great expediency—the idea was first distributed to Con-
gressional offices in November 2008108 and was enacted eight months
later109—the program’s primary focus was stimulating the economy,110 not
safety or promoting new technology. Additionally, the Democratic Party
controlled both the house and the senate at this time, arguably contributing
to the CARS program’s speedy enactment.
Legislators serve the voting public, but it is unclear if the voting public
would support a government incentive program for driverless vehicles. Fifty
percent of the general public has expressed support for government incen-
tives, like the Energy Improvement and Extension Act’s tax credit, that re-
ward consumers for adopting plug-in electric vehicle technology.111 But
even if all these individuals also supported incentives for driverless vehicles,
this is hardly a resounding public endorsement that would cause Congress to
unify quickly.
It’s also uncertain how much money would need to be allocated to a
driverless vehicle incentive program. The CARS program ended because it
ran out of money,112 and programs that rely on direct public subsidies are
difficult to support over time. But data suggests that driverless vehicles, if
their safety benefits are truly realized, could save the federal government
money; “public revenues paid for roughly seven percent of all motor vehicle
crash costs” in 2010, and $10 billion came from federal funds.113 Presumably
105. See supra Introduction.
106. See Contact Sport: The Politics of Auto Safety, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/rollover/unsafe/ptheme.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
107. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 4,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
108. See Tyrrell, supra note 100, at 474.
109. See supra Part III.B.
110. Id.
111. DELOITTE, supra note 33, at 14.
112. See supra Part III.
113. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL
IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED), at 239 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa
.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013.
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the widespread adoption of driverless vehicles will reduce this financial bur-
den, but the true monetary impact of driverless vehicles on the crash econ-
omy is difficult to predict.
CONCLUSION
Driverless vehicles, if adopted, could have a significant impact on mo-
bility, the economy, and vehicle safety. As car crashes remain a leading
cause of death, it’s important to embrace and encourage technologies that
can help keep people safe on the roads. Luckily, driverless technology has
evolved rapidly, and law and regulations permitting, the United States could
see driverless cars on its roads in less than a decade.
But while it’s easy to get caught up in engineering and legal concerns,
when designing a consumer product one must keep in mind the “four P’s of
marketing” – product, price, place, and promotion.114 Some consumers, par-
ticularly millennials, are ready to adopt the product, but price sensitivity may
prevent them from becoming the much-needed innovators and early adopters
of the technology.
Subsidy programs can change a consumer’s purchase behavior. A fed-
eral incentive program for the adoption of driverless vehicles, especially if
modeled after the popular Cash for Clunkers program, could be a great suc-
cess, but only if Congress can agree to implement such a program. And
Congress should agree because the benefits of driverless vehicles – increas-
ing mobility for those unable to drive, decreasing energy use and pollution,
lessening traffic congestion, and most importantly, decreasing the number of
car crashes and related fatalities – justifies investing in the technology.
While the initial investment may outweigh the immediate return, driverless
technology needs the support of forward-looking legislators in order to
achieve significant market penetration. Lawmakers should familiarize them-
selves with driverless technology through research and product demonstra-
tions, abandon any preconceived notions or fears about driverless cars, and
consider implementing subsidies that will facilitate the widespread adoption
of new and safer transportation technologies.
114. See The Four Ps of Marketing, PURELY BRANDED, http://www.purelybranded.com/
insights/the-four-ps-of-marketing/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
